A Call for International Regulation of the Thriving  Industry  of Death Tourism by Safyan, Alexander R.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-2011
A Call for International Regulation of the Thriving
"Industry" of Death Tourism
Alexander R. Safyan
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alexander R. Safyan, A Call for International Regulation of the Thriving "Industry" of Death Tourism, 33 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
287 (2011).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol33/iss2/3
  
 
287 
A CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATION OF THE THRIVING 
“INDUSTRY” OF DEATH TOURISM 
Alexander R. Safyan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 7, 2009, distinguished English conductor Sir Edward 
Downes traveled with his wife, Lady Joan, to Zurich, Switzerland.1 
Three days later, the couple visited the assisted suicide clinic Dignitas, 
where workers provided them with a clear, liquid drink that would 
enable them to end their lives together.2 Sir Edward and Lady Joan 
drank the “cocktail of barbiturates,” lay next to each other holding 
hands, and died within minutes.3 Lady Joan was seventy-four years old, 
and in the final stages of terminal cancer; Sir Edward was eighty-five 
years old, and nearly blind and deaf.4 However, unlike his wife, Sir 
Edward was not terminally ill.5 
This story sparked new controversy surrounding the practices of 
assisted suicide clinics such as Dignitas, which offer patients the ability 
to peacefully and painlessly end their lives. Yet this story is only one of 
several highly publicized reports of individuals traveling abroad in 
search of assistance in committing suicide. For example, in January 
2003, a seventy-four-year-old man named Reginald Crew, who had 
been diagnosed with motor neuron disease, became one of the first 
 
* J.D., Loyola Law School Los Angeles, 2011; B.A., University of Southern California, 2008.  I 
would like to thank my parents for their unconditional love and support.  I would also like to 
thank my friends Dan Hauptman, who gave me the idea for this note, and Jordan Ludwig and 
Michael Pearson, for proofreading it and providing input. 
 1. John F. Burns, With Help, Conductor and Wife Ended Lives, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/world/europe/15britain.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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British citizens to die with the help of Dignitas’s services.6 In April 
2003, a British couple’s decision to die at Dignitas generated 
widespread criticism of the clinic’s practices because neither person was 
terminally ill.7 Robert Stokes, age fifty-nine, suffered from epilepsy, 
while his wife, Jennifer, age fifty-three, had back problems and 
diabetes.8 Perhaps the most controversial story surfaced in September 
2008, when twenty-three-year-old Daniel James, who had been 
paralyzed from a rugby injury, ended his life at Dignitas with his 
parents by his side.9 The prevalence of such stories has led many 
authors and commentators to popularize the term “death tourism,” 
which describes the phenomenon of citizens traveling to foreign 
countries in search of assistance in taking their lives.10  
The emergence of death tourism as a new “industry” has revived 
international debate regarding the legalization of physician-assisted 
suicide and euthanasia. Indeed, several countries have recently taken 
steps to address the phenomenon. In February 2010, following a five-
month-long public response period, the Director of Public Prosecutions 
in the United Kingdom issued new guidelines designed to clarify the 
circumstances under which individuals planning to assist another in 
suicide could expect to face prosecution.11 Similarly, following its own 
several-month-long consultation process, the Federal Council in 
Switzerland recently announced that it planned to introduce stricter 
regulations against assisted suicide.12 Other countries, however, have 
dismissed death tourism as a potential problem, either because their 
laws expressly prohibit it or because their culture prevents it from 
 
 6. See Fiona Fleck, Dignitas “Helps Physically Healthy to Die”, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 26, 
2003, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/switzerland/1420106/ 
Dignitas-helps-physically-healthy-to-die.html. 
 7. UK Couple Die at Suicide Clinic, BBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2003, 17:33 GMT), http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2948365.stm. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Daniel Foggo, Why Daniel James Chose to Die, SUNDAY TIMES (Oct. 19, 2008), 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article4969423.ece. 
 10. Rohith Srinivas, Exploring the Potential for American Death Tourism, 13 MICH. ST. U. 
J. MED. & L. 91, 94 (2009); see Hilary White, Switzerland Refuses to Alter Assisted Suicide Law 
to Nix Death Tourism, LIFESITENEWS.COM (June 2, 2006, 11:15 EST), http://www.lifesitenews. 
com/ldn/2006/jun/06060210.html. 
 11. A Public Consultation on the DPP’s Interim Policy for Prosecutors on Assisted Suicide, 
CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_index.html (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2011). 
 12. Press Release, Swiss Federal Council, Specific Regulations for Organised Assisted 
Suicide in Switzerland; Swiss Federal Council Acknowledges Results of Consultation Process 
(Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.admin.ch/br/aktuell/00091/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=35187 
[hereinafter Swiss Federal Council Press Release]. 
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occurring.13 In any case, leaders agree that they would not like to see 
their countries become breeding grounds for “death tourists.”14 
With reports of death tourism on the rise,15 and criticism of the 
increasingly ineffective safeguards of local assisted suicide laws 
mounting, the question becomes:  Should international law do anything 
to address this phenomenon? If the answer to this question is “yes,” then 
the logical subsequent question is:  What form should a resolution take, 
such that it preserves individual nations’ sovereignty while 
simultaneously promoting the integrity of obligations imposed by 
domestic law? 
This Note asserts that regulation of death tourism is an essential 
step in defusing the international community’s concerns over the 
controversial practice. Further, this Note posits that the most effective 
tool for curtailing death tourism is the adoption of an instrument of “soft 
law,”16 which would grant countries flexibility in shaping their 
responsibilities toward assisted suicide of non-citizens, as well as 
provide a less formal, and thus more conciliatory, framework for 
compliance with those responsibilities. It is important to note that this 
Note does not undertake a debate as to the moral, ethical, or legal 
justifications for or against assisted suicide. Rather, this Note argues 
that—notwithstanding one’s personal views about the legality of the 
practice—a system where non-terminally ill individuals can travel 
abroad and enlist the services of death clinics to help them end their 
lives offends both notions of international comity and respect for the 
obligations of domestic law. 
Part II of this Note sets forth the various end-of-life procedures 
available to patients and examines some of the principal arguments 
surrounding the use of those procedures. Part III analyzes and compares 
the laws of four countries with contrasting positions on the legitimacy 
of end-of-life procedures:  the United Kingdom, the United States, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland. The choice (and order of presentation) of 
these four countries represents a broad sweep over the spectrum of end-
 
 13. See Srinivas, supra note 10, at 102–03. 
 14. See, e.g., Steven Ertelt, Switzerland Government Official Wants Assisted Suicide Death 
Tourism to Stop, LIFENEWS.COM (July 14, 2008, 9:00 AM), http://www.lifenews.com/bio2510. 
html (Swiss Minister Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf seeking to curb death tourism in Switzerland). 
 15. Id. (stating that as of May 2008, the number of individuals, especially British citizens, 
choosing to end their lives at Dignitas was on the rise). 
 16. Part IV of this Note elaborates on the definition of soft law and explores the benefits of 
utilizing a soft law instrument rather than an instrument of “hard law,” such as a binding treaty. 
For now, a sufficient working definition of soft law is an informal, non-binding instrument, such 
as a resolution or recommendation, that can be viewed as a third source of international law, in 
addition to treaties and customary international law. 
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of-life jurisprudence, and features countries whose laws move from 
most restrictive to least restrictive. Additionally, Part III considers 
which of these countries presents the greatest potential for death 
tourism, affording special attention to recent proposals for change 
introduced by the countries’ policymakers. Part IV articulates a 
proposal for international regulation of death tourism through the means 
of a soft law instrument and explains why such an instrument would be 
favorable to a hard law alternative. Finally, Part V concludes that 
although non-binding in nature, “soft” regulation of death tourism could 
lead to the desired effect of influencing countries’ behavior toward each 
other’s citizens and increasing their respect for the laws of their 
sovereign neighbors. 
II.  DEFINING AND CONCEPTUALIZING VARIOUS END-OF-LIFE 
PROCEDURES 
A.  Defining the Terminology 
Before engaging in a comparative analysis of the laws in different 
countries governing end-of-life procedures, it is necessary to identify 
and define the terminology that describes these procedures. The first 
important distinction to make is between assisted suicide and 
euthanasia. While many believe these terms are synonymous,17 a more 
accurate definition focuses on who ultimately brings about the patient’s 
death.18 As the word “suicide” suggests, assisted suicide entails the 
patient ultimately taking her own life. The American Medical 
Association defines physician-assisted suicide (PAS)19 as “a physician 
facilitat[ing] a patient’s death by providing the necessary means and/or 
information to enable the patient to perform the life-ending act.”20 Thus, 
under this scenario, while the patient receives assistance from a 
physician—either in the form of medication, instruction, or advice—the 
key component is that the patient herself carries out the final act, rather 
 
 17. See Lara L. Manzione, Is There a Right to Die?:  A Comparative Study of Three 
Societies (Australia, Netherlands, United States), 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 443, 445 (2002) 
(noting that “[t]he term euthanasia is more routinely used by the population at large as a general 
one to mean any form of hastened death”). 
 18. See Srinivas, supra note 10, at 94. 
 19. Although assisted suicide does not have to involve a physician, most commentators 
prefer this term since it is generally the case that a physician is required to provide the patient 
with the appropriate means to end her life (i.e., by writing a prescription). See, e.g., WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 70.245.020(1) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2003). 
 20. Opinion 2.211:  Physician-Assisted Suicide, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org 
/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2211.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2011). 
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than the physician. Conversely, euthanasia, which originates from the 
Greek eu, meaning “good,” and thanatos, meaning “death,”21 involves 
the physician acting to cause the patient’s death.22 The physician will 
most often do this by administering a lethal injection or removing the 
patient from some form of life-support.23 Whatever the action, the 
defining characteristic of euthanasia is that the physician, not the 
patient, carries out the ultimate life-ending act. 
Euthanasia can further be classified as active or passive, and 
voluntary or involuntary. Active euthanasia involves a physician or 
other person directly acting to end a patient’s life.24 An example of this 
would be a physician injecting a patient with a drug that causes the 
patient’s death. On the other hand, passive euthanasia entails foregoing 
or discontinuing life-sustaining treatment.25 For instance, a physician 
may refrain from inserting a feeding tube into a patient’s body or he 
may disconnect the patient from life-support. Passive euthanasia is 
allowed in most countries, as this practice is generally associated with a 
patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, rather than a request that the 
physician “kill” her.26 Most countries that criminalize euthanasia 
specifically proscribe active euthanasia. These countries view active 
euthanasia as a form of “killing,”27 and distinguish between “killing” 
and “letting die,” the latter of which they consider morally acceptable.28 
Though the line between killing and letting die may be blurry, the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia is clear.29 This 
distinction plays a crucial role in the moral debate surrounding end-of-
life procedures. Voluntary euthanasia refers to a situation where a 
 
 21. Manzione, supra note 17, at 445. 
 22. See Wendy N. Weigand, Has the Time Come for Doctor Death:  Should Physician-
Assisted Suicide be Legalized?, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 321, 322–23 (1992–93). 
 23. Id. at 322. 
 24. See Lindsay Pfeffer, Note, A Final Plea for “Death With Dignity”:  A Proposal for the 
Modification and Approval of the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill in the United 
Kingdom, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 497, 510 (2007).  
  25. See N. Ferreira, Latest Legal and Social Developments in the Euthanasia Debate:  Bad 
Moral Consciences and Political Unrest, 26 MED. & L. 387, 389 (2007). 
 26. See Remigius N. Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the New Property Regime in Human 
Bodies and Body Parts, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 19, 55–57 (2002) (explaining the 
distinction between refusal of life-sustaining treatment, which is a constitutional right recognized 
in the United States, and assisted suicide or [active] euthanasia). 
 27. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Democratic 
World:  A Legal Overview, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 3 (2003). 
 28. See Kelly Green, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia:  Safeguarding Against the 
“Slippery Slope”—The Netherlands Versus the United States, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
639, 645 (2003). 
 29. See Srinivas, supra note 10, at 95. 
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physician ends a patient’s life at the request of the patient and with the 
patient’s informed consent.30 Involuntary euthanasia, however, refers to 
a case where a patient has not consented, either because she is 
physically or mentally unable to, or because she has expressly stated 
that she does not wish to be euthanized.31 Some describe the former 
situation—where the patient is unable to consent—as non-voluntary 
euthanasia, and the latter situation—where the patient has indicated that 
she does not want to be euthanized—as involuntary euthanasia.32 For 
purposes of this Note, however, this distinction is irrelevant. 
B.  Competing Positions 
Arguments for and against these aforementioned procedures 
abound, most of which are enveloped in larger debates concerning 
moral, ethical, and legal issues. The arguments in support of PAS and 
euthanasia center around two main principles:  “personal autonomy and 
the right to be free from undue suffering.”33 With regard to the first 
principle, proponents contend that individuals have a right to self-
determination.34 In other words, people are free to make decisions that 
affect their own lives. The underlying premise of this argument is the 
belief that the right to choose how to live one’s life necessarily 
encompasses the right to choose how to end it.35 The second principle, 
the right to be free from extreme suffering, is founded upon notions of 
mercy and compassion. This principle maintains that individuals should 
not contribute to the pain and suffering of others, but rather, should 
alleviate such pain whenever possible,36 including by ending an afflicted 
individual’s life. Advocates of these two principles urge their countries 
to pass laws permitting PAS and voluntary euthanasia under the proper 
circumstances. 
On the other side of the debate, those who oppose life-ending 
procedures argue that a physician should never be permitted to 
knowingly and voluntarily take a patient’s life. This argument is deeply 
rooted in several fundamental beliefs. First, most opponents of PAS and 
euthanasia contend that a theoretical “right to die” never outweighs the 
value of human life.37 In support of their position, opponents point to 
 
 30. See Ferreira, supra note 25, at 390. 
 31. Id. at 392. 
 32. See Srinivas, supra note 10, at 95. 
 33. See Green, supra note 28, at 642. 
 34. Id. at 643. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Ferreira, supra note 25, at 391. 
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the use of modern drugs to control pain and new developments in 
medicine that will extend patients’ lives further than ever imagined.38 
Second, opponents of PAS and euthanasia emphasize the difficulty 
physicians face in determining whether the patient has voluntarily 
consented.39 This difficulty stems from such problems as ascertaining 
whether the patient is rational or competent to consent in the first 
place.40 Third, and perhaps most controversially, those who disapprove 
of PAS and euthanasia raise “slippery slope” arguments against these 
practices.41 These arguments theorize that the legalization of PAS and 
euthanasia will lead to widespread abuse of vulnerable groups of 
people.42 Specifically, the poor and the elderly may feel pressure to 
prematurely end their lives so as not to impose financial or emotional 
burdens on their families.43 In addition, the mentally ill and disabled 
may be misled into requesting death, either by their loved ones or by 
their treating physicians.44 Regardless of the specific objection, most 
opponents agree that the proliferation of life-ending procedures would 
result in a deterioration of the physician-patient relationship,45 as it 
would erode the trust in the relationship as well as the view that 
physicians are healers.46 
III.  COMPARATIVE LAW AND THE POTENTIAL FOR DEATH TOURISM 
This section analyzes and compares the laws regulating end-of-life 
procedures in the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, 
and Switzerland. In the course of this analysis, this section also 
considers the extent to which each of these countries represents a 
potential death tourism destination. 
A.  The United Kingdom 
With its policymakers endlessly debating the legalization of PAS 
and its citizens comprising the largest number of people traveling 
abroad to be assisted in death, the United Kingdom is at the forefront of 
the death tourism phenomenon. The U.K.’s House of Lords has 
repeatedly rejected attempts to pass a bill permitting assisted suicide, 
 
 38. See id. at 392. 
 39. See id. at 391. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.; Green, supra note 28, at 646. 
 42. See Green, supra note 28, at 646. 
 43. See id. at 647–48. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. at 649. 
 46. Id. at 649–50. 
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and popular sentiment in favor of the practice has gone largely 
unheeded.47 Only the recent decision by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) to promulgate new guidelines regarding the 
prosecution of assisted suicide violators has produced any hope for a 
change in the status quo.48 
In 1961, Parliament passed the Suicide Act, which eliminated 
suicide as a crime while simultaneously introducing a new offense for 
assisting another in suicide.49 The Act provided that “[a] person who 
aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of another, or an attempt by 
another to commit suicide” would be subject to imprisonment for up to 
fourteen years.50 This punishment remains one of the most severe of its 
kind in Europe.51 Not coincidentally, therefore, the United Kingdom has 
experienced perhaps the greatest public clamor for relaxation of its 
assisted suicide laws. 
1.  The Case of Diane Pretty 
The first highly publicized challenge to the U.K.’s assisted suicide 
ban came in 2000, when a woman named Diane Pretty petitioned the 
DPP to declare that her husband would not be prosecuted for helping 
her commit suicide.52 Ms. Pretty was diagnosed with motor neuron 
disease—a condition that would ultimately paralyze her—and sought 
permission for her husband to assist her in peacefully ending her life.53 
The DPP refused her request, leading Ms. Pretty to bring her challenge 
to the judiciary.54 
The Divisional Court dismissed Ms. Pretty’s claim. It found that 
the DPP did not have power to grant immunity to Ms. Pretty’s husband 
for future or proposed criminal conduct, and that the Suicide Act 1961 
was not incompatible with the European Convention on Human 
 
 47. Pfeffer, supra note 24, at 521; see Lords Block Assisted Dying Bill, BBC NEWS (May 12, 
2006, 16:43 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4763067.stm. 
 48. Caroline Davies, Assisted Suicide Guidelines Will Ease Fears, Says DPP, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 23, 2009, 21:23 BST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/sep/23/assisted-suicide-
guidelines-dpp. 
 49. Suicide Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 60, §§ 1–2 (Eng.). 
 50. Id. § 2(1).  
 51. Pfeffer, supra note 24, at 498. 
 52. John Keown, European Court of Human Rights:  Death in Strasbourg—Assisted 
Suicide, the Pretty Case, and the European Convention on Human Rights, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
722, 723 (2003); see Suicide Act, 1961, supra note 49, § 2(4) (stating that “no proceedings shall 
be instituted for [assisted suicide] except by or with the consent of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions”). 
 53. Keown, supra note 52, at 722. 
 54. Id. at 723. 
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Rights.55 Ms. Pretty appealed the Court’s decision to the House of 
Lords, which also rejected her claim.56 Finally, Ms. Pretty brought her 
case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 
Before the ECHR, Ms. Pretty asserted two primary arguments 
under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and several alternative arguments under Articles 8, 9, and 14.57 First, 
Ms. Pretty asserted that Article 2, which protects the right to life, also 
guarantees a negative right, the right to choose not to live.58 The ECHR, 
however, found that Article 2 was concerned with the protection and 
preservation of life and could not, without a distortion of language, be 
interpreted to also confer the right to choose to die.59 Ms. Pretty’s 
second argument focused on Article 3 of the Convention, which states, 
“[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”60 Ms. Pretty claimed that the State’s 
prohibition on assisted suicide and the DPP’s refusal to grant 
prospective immunity to her husband constituted inhuman and 
degrading treatment in violation of the Convention.61 The Court rejected 
this argument as well, explaining that Article 3 only required states to 
ensure that individuals within their jurisdictions were not subjected to 
inhuman treatment, but did not require them to actively provide 
treatment to individuals who required medical care.62  
In addition to the aforementioned arguments, Ms. Pretty raised 
alternative arguments under Articles 8, 9, and 14 of the Convention. 
Based on Article 8, which prohibits interference in individuals’ lives 
except when necessary to protect interests such as public safety,63 
Ms. Pretty claimed that the State’s assisted suicide ban violated her 
right to privacy and self-determination.64 The Court found that 
interference by the State in this matter was justified because the State 
 
 55. Pretty v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [2001] EWHC (Admin) 788, [31]–[32], [66] (Eng.). 
 56. Keown, supra note 52, at 723. 
 57. See id. (discussing each of Ms. Pretty’s arguments before the ECHR).  
 58. See id.; Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms states, “[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall 
be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.” European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter ECHR]. 
 59. See Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 4–8 (2002); 
Keown, supra note 52. 
 60. ECHR, supra note 58, art. 3. 
 61. See Keown, supra note 52, at 724. 
 62. Pretty, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 9. 
 63. ECHR, supra note 58, art. 8. 
 64. See Pretty, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 4. 
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had the right to use criminal law to protect vulnerable groups of people 
(such as the terminally ill) and to regulate activities that endangered the 
safety of others.65 Under Article 9, Ms. Pretty argued that the State’s 
prohibition on assisted suicide violated her freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion.66 The Court quickly rejected this contention, 
finding that Ms. Pretty’s views on assisted suicide were not 
manifestations of religious belief or thought.67 Finally, with respect to 
Article 14, which prohibits discrimination under the Convention,68 
Ms. Pretty claimed that a blanket ban on assisted suicide discriminated 
between individuals who were physically able to commit suicide 
without assistance and those who were unable to do so.69 As with her 
other claims, the ECHR refused to entertain Ms. Pretty’s contention. It 
concluded that the State had legitimate safety reasons for refusing to 
distinguish between people who were capable of committing suicide on 
their own and those who required assistance.70 
2.  Recent Developments in the United Kingdom 
Since the ECHR’s dismissal of the Pretty case, the United 
Kingdom has witnessed several key developments in the assisted 
suicide/death tourism story. In 2004, Lord Joel Joffe introduced the 
Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, modeled after Oregon’s 
Death with Dignity Act,71 discussed below in Part III.B. The House of 
Lords formed a Select Committee to review the Bill, and the committee 
published an extensive report with statistical findings, analyses of other 
countries’ laws, and recommendations for improving the bill.72 
Following the report, Lord Joffe submitted a new version of the bill in 
2005. The bill’s stated purpose was to “[e]nable an adult who has 
capacity and who is suffering unbearably as a result of a terminal illness 
to receive medical assistance to die at his own considered and persistent 
request.”73 The proposed legislation authorized a physician to assist a 
patient in suicide by prescribing lethal medication, or, in the case of a 
patient who was unable to orally ingest that medication, by providing 
 
 65. See Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 3–4 (2002). 
 66. See ECHR, supra note 58, art. 9. 
 67. See Pretty, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 3–4. 
 68. See ECHR, supra note 58, art. 14. 
 69. See Pretty, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 40. 
 70. See id. at 4–5. 
 71. Paul Raine, A Right to Die? The Case of Diane Pretty (2006) (on file with the Loyola of 
Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review); Pfeffer, supra note 24, at 503. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, 2005, H.L. Bill [36] (Gr. Brit.). 
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means of self-administration.74 Despite providing many of the same 
safeguards as other countries’ assisted suicide laws—including 
requirements of capacity, a terminal illness, an effective year-long 
residency, and minimum waiting periods75—the bill was rejected by the 
House of Lords in May 2006.76 Since then, no other proposed law has 
made it as far in the legislative process.77 In May 2009, however, Lord 
Charles Falconer launched a campaign calling for the legal protection of 
individuals who traveled abroad to assist loved ones in committing 
suicide.78 His campaign achieved mixed results:  the law remains 
unchanged today, but recent steps taken by the DPP have somewhat 
clarified the uncertainty surrounding the prosecution of assisted 
suicide.79 
In September 2009, the DPP provided this clarification by finally 
agreeing to issue new guidelines regarding his office’s decisions to 
prosecute cases of assisted suicide.80 Besides Diane Pretty, many others 
had unsuccessfully petitioned the DPP to issue such guidelines for 
decades. The most recent challenger, a woman named Debbie Purdy, 
finally succeeded. Like Diane Pretty, Ms. Purdy, who had been 
diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, sought assurance from the DPP that 
her husband would not be prosecuted for accompanying her abroad to 
help her commit suicide.81 The DPP denied Ms. Purdy’s request, and the 
U.K. courts rejected her subsequent legal challenge. Surprisingly, 
however, in its decision, the House of Lords expressed support for 
clarification of the DPP’s polices on prosecuting assisted suicide.82 The 
DPP obliged by issuing an interim policy, which established “public 
 
 74. Id. § 1. 
 75. See id. §§ 1–16; John Coggon & Søren Holm, The Assisted Dying Bill—”Death 
Tourism” and European Law (2006), available at http://www.ccels.cf.ac.uk/archives/issues/2006/ 
coggon_holm.pdf. 
 76. Diana Hassel, Sex and Death:  Lawrence’s Liberty and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 9 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1003, 1025 n.133 (2007). 
 77. See Isabel Oakeshott, Lord Falconer Backs Suicide Reform, SUNDAY TIMES (May 31, 
2009), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6395949.ece. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Liam Creedon, New Guidelines Ease Relatives’ Fear of Assisted Suicide, 
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/ 
health-news/new-guidelines-ease-relatives-fear-of-assisted-suicide-1791910.html. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See Francis Gibb & Helen Nugent, MS Sufferer Loses Battle on Assisted Suicide, TIMES, 
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interest factors” in support of, and against, prosecution.83 Following 
publication of this policy, the DPP sought public consultation through a 
collection of individual responses and comments to a series of questions 
regarding the policy.84 After considering the public’s responses, the 
DPP issued its final policy in February 2010.85 
According to the new policy, “encouraging or assisting suicide” 
remains an offense under the Suicide Act 1961.86 However, prosecutors 
must now apply a “Full Code Test,” which is comprised of two stages:  
an evidential stage and a public interest stage.87 A prosecution will only 
proceed if first, the evidential stage is met, and second, a prosecution is 
deemed necessary in the public interest.88 For the evidential stage, a 
prosecutor must prove that:  “[1] the suspect did an act capable of 
encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another 
person; and [2] the suspect’s act was intended to encourage or assist 
suicide or an attempt at suicide.”89 If there is sufficient evidence of both 
elements, the DPP will then consider whether prosecution is in the 
public interest. The DPP does this by reviewing the facts and merits of 
the particular case and weighing “public interest factors” both for and 
against prosecution.90 Public interest factors in favor of prosecution 
include whether the victim was under eighteen years of age or did not 
have the capacity to reach an informed decision, and whether the 
assisting party persuaded or pressured the victim into committing 
suicide.91 Public interest factors against prosecution include whether the 
victim made a voluntary and informed decision to commit suicide, 
whether the assisting party was wholly motivated by compassion, and 
whether the assisting party reported the victim’s suicide to the police 
and fully assisted them in their investigation.92 
 
 83. See DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, INTERIM POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS IN RESPECT OF 
CASES OF ASSISTED SUICIDE (2009), available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_ 
consultation.pdf. 
 84. See A Public Consultation on the DPP’s Interim Policy for Prosecutors on Assisted 
Suicide, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_index.html (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
 85. See Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of 
Encouraging or Assisting Suicide, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. (Feb. 2010), http://www.cps.gov. 
uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html. 
 86. Id. ¶ 1. 
 87. Id. ¶ 13. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. ¶ 17. 
 90. Id. ¶¶ 38–39. 
 91. There are sixteen total factors that weigh in favor of prosecution. See id. ¶ 43(1)–(2), (5), 
(7). 
 92. There are six total factors that weigh against prosecution. See id. ¶ 45(1)–(2), (6). 
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The DPP announced that the new policy did not decriminalize 
assisted suicide or assure any person that she will be immune from 
prosecution for encouraging or assisting another in suicide.93 Rather, the 
new policy is intended to “provide a clear framework for prosecutors to 
decide which cases should proceed to court and which should not.”94 
While assisted suicide is still an offense punishable by up to fourteen 
years imprisonment, the DPP acknowledged early on that the new 
policy may lead to an increase in assisted suicide in the United 
Kingdom.95 Certainly, there will be no flurry of assisted suicide clinics 
opening in the country to welcome death tourists; but the new policy 
may make it easier for British citizens to travel abroad for suicide with 
reassurance that their loved ones will not be prosecuted for assisting 
them. Only time will tell what kind of effect the new policy will have. 
B.  The United States 
No federal law in the United States directly permits or prohibits 
PAS or euthanasia. Instead, the right to legislate on end-of-life 
procedures lies within the purview of the individual states.96 Currently, 
only Oregon and Washington have enacted statutory provisions 
allowing PAS under certain conditions.97 However, in Montana, a 
district court judge declared in December 2008 that the State’s 
constitution recognizes the right of terminally ill patients to “die with 
dignity” by obtaining a prescription for lethal medication from their 
physicians.98 The State Attorney General appealed the case to the 
Montana Supreme Court, which issued a ruling in December 2009 
affirming the district court’s judgment, albeit on much narrower 
grounds.99 Specifically, the Court refrained from answering the 
constitutional question whether terminally ill patients actually enjoy a 
right to “die with dignity”; instead, the Court held that a physician’s aid 
in a patient’s death does not violate the State’s public policy exception 
 
 93. Id. ¶ 6. 
 94. Press Release, Crown Prosecution Serv., DPP Publishes Assisted Suicide Policy, 
available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_releases/109_10/. 
 95. Caroline Davies, Assisted Suicide Guidelines Will Ease Fears, Says DPP, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 23, 2009, 21:23 BST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/sep/23/assisted-suicide-
guidelines-dpp. 
 96. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 798–99 (1997). 
 97. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.995 (2003); WASH. 
REV. CODE. § 70.245 (2009). 
 98. Baxter v. State, No. ADV-2007-787, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482 (Dec. 5, 2008), 
vacated, 2009 MT 449. 
 99. Kirk Johnson, Montana Ruling Bolsters Doctor-Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01suicide.html. 
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to the consent defense.100 The Court’s decision effectively makes 
Montana the third state to legally recognize PAS, though that right has 
not yet been codified by statute. Even with these states’ acceptance of 
PAS, euthanasia remains illegal in every state.101 
1.  Judicial Background Regarding the Constitutionality of PAS 
Several United States Supreme Court decisions from the past 
twenty or so years have helped shape the current landscape of PAS 
jurisprudence in the United States. In 1990, the Supreme Court faced 
the question of whether the United States Constitution guaranteed a 
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.102 The patient in that case, 
Nancy Cruzan, suffered severe injuries in an automobile accident that 
rendered her permanently disabled and in a “persistent vegetative 
state.”103 Her parents sought to remove Cruzan from an artificial 
nutrition and hydration device that was keeping her alive. The Supreme 
Court held that patients have the right, guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment.104 The Court based its decision on 
traditional common law principles of battery, bodily integrity, and 
freedom from unwanted touching,105 declining to draw a corollary 
between the right to refuse treatment and a “right to die with dignity.”106 
In 1997, following the passage of Oregon’s assisted suicide law, 
the Supreme Court issued a critical decision that threatened the rights of 
assisted suicide supporters in the United States. In Washington v. 
Glucksberg, the Court upheld a Washington state law that banned 
assisted suicide, finding that the Constitution did not confer a 
fundamental right to “commit suicide with another’s assistance.”107 The 
Court balanced the patient’s asserted right to assistance in suicide 
against the State’s multiple interests in preserving life, preventing 
suicide, and protecting the integrity of the medical profession, and 
concluded that Washington’s assisted suicide ban was reasonably 
 
 100. Baxter v. State, 2009 MT 449, 354 Mont. 234, 224 P.3d 1211. Under Montana law, a 
victim’s consent to a crime is a defense to that crime. MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 45, § 45-2-211(1) 
(2009). However, there are four exceptions to the consent defense, the relevant one here being a 
violation of public policy in recognizing the defense. Id. § 45-2-211(2). 
 101. See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 804–05. 
 102. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990). 
 103. Id. at 265–66. 
 104. Id. at 277. 
 105. Id. at 269. 
 106. Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 107. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997). 
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related to legitimate state interests.108 Opponents of Glucksberg have 
criticized the Court’s narrow interpretation of the asserted right in that 
case—to wit, the right to commit suicide with another’s assistance—and 
have instead characterized it as a right to “die with dignity” or to choose 
the means of one’s death.109 Advocates of PAS, however, have noted 
that in its decision, the Court encouraged individuals to continue to 
engage in “an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, 
and practicality of physician-assisted suicide.”110 
On the same day it decided Glucksberg, the Supreme Court ruled 
in Vacco v. Quill that New York’s prohibition of PAS did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.111 The 
plaintiffs in Vacco argued that the State of New York unfairly 
discriminated against the rights of the terminally ill by permitting 
competent patients to refuse medical treatment—as in Cruzan—while 
forbidding patients from requesting assisted suicide.112 The Court 
rejected this argument and drew a clear line between refusing life-
sustaining treatment and requesting life-ending treatment.113 The Court 
concluded that the State had acted rationally in differentiating between 
these two competing rights and declared that the state’s laws followed a 
“longstanding and rational distinction.”114 Importantly, the Court’s 
decision, insofar as it was based on its interpretation of the federal 
Constitution, confirmed that the states were free to decide for 
themselves whether their respective state constitutions recognized a 
right to PAS or euthanasia.115 
2.  State Laws Recognizing PAS 
In the midst of the Supreme Court’s adjudication of the right to 
assisted suicide, Oregon became the first state to legalize PAS in limited 
circumstances.116 Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA) was first 
passed in 1994 by a state ballot measure that drew a fifty-one percent 
vote of Oregon residents.117 After multiple legal challenges and court-
 
 108. Id. at 728–32, 735. 
 109. See Yale Kamisar, Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look at the End of Life 
and Personal Autonomy, 24 ISSUES L. & MED. 95, 102–03 (2008). 
 110. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735. 
 111. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997).  
 112. Id. at 797–98. 
 113. Id. at 800–01. 
 114. Id. at 807–08. 
 115. See id. at 799. 
 116. Srinivas, supra note 10, at 101. 
 117. Trevor Stiles, Gonzales v. Oregon and the Future of Agency-Made Criminal Law, 97 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1261, 1269 (2007). 
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ordered injunctions delayed its enforcement, the law finally went into 
effect in 1997, when Oregon voters rejected a measure to repeal the law 
by a sixty percent vote.118 
The ODWDA allows competent, terminally ill patients who are 
residents of Oregon to request PAS under certain conditions. It 
provides: 
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been 
determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be 
suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed 
his or her wish to die, may make a written request for medication for 
the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified 
manner . . . .119 
Under the ODWDA, a patient is considered “capable” if, in the 
opinion of the court or the patient’s attending or consulting physician, 
psychiatrist, or psychologist, the patient is able to make and 
communicate health care decisions to her physicians.120 The patient 
must be suffering from a terminal disease, defined by the ODWDA as 
an incurable and irreversible disease that will, within reasonable 
medical judgment, produce death within six months.121 The patient’s 
decision to die must be voluntary and “informed,”122 and the patient 
must make and sign a written request for lethal medication in the 
presence of at least two witnesses, one of whom must not be a relative, 
a person entitled to any part of the patient’s estate, or a health care 
provider.123 
The attending physician must make the initial determination as to 
whether the patient is capable, has a terminal disease, and has made the 
request for medication voluntarily.124 The attending physician must also 
ensure that the patient has made an informed decision, meaning that the 
physician has informed the patient of:  (1) the physician’s medical 
diagnosis; (2) the physician’s prognosis; (3) the potential risks 
associated with taking the prescribed medication; (4) the probable result 
of taking the prescribed medication; and (5) the feasible alternatives, 
including hospice care and pain control.125 Finally, the attending 
physician must refer the patient to a consulting physician, who must 
 
 118. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 27, at 13. 
 119. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2003). 
 120. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800(3) (2003). 
 121. Id. § 127.800(12). 
 122. § 127.830. 
 123. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.810 (2003). 
 124. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815(1)(a) (2003). 
 125. Id. § 127.815(1)(c). 
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confirm the attending physician’s diagnosis and verify that the patient is 
capable and acting voluntarily.126 Once these requirements are satisfied, 
the attending physician may write a prescription for lethal 
medication;127 however, the attending physician must wait at least 
fifteen days after the patient’s initial oral request, or at least forty-eight 
hours after the patient’s written request, before providing the patient 
with the prescription.128 
Oregon remained the only state to have legalized PAS for over a 
decade.129 Then, in November 2008, voters in the State of Washington 
approved a law that virtually mirrored the law in Oregon.130 
Washington’s Death with Dignity Act (WDWDA) contains nearly 
identical language to its Oregon counterpart, differing only with respect 
to a few trivial characteristics.131 The WDWDA includes all of the same 
procedural requirements and safeguards as the ODWDA and shares its 
fundamental purpose. 
3.  The Potential for Death Tourism 
A unique feature of both the ODWDA and WDWDA, which 
distinguishes these laws from those in the Netherlands and in 
Switzerland, is that the patient must prove that she is a resident of the 
state to qualify for PAS.132 In Oregon, the patient can prove residency 
through some combination of possessing a state-issued driver’s license, 
being registered to vote in the state, owning or leasing property in the 
state, or filing a tax return in the state.133 In Washington, the same 
criteria apply, with the exception of filing a tax return in the state.134  
These residency requirements act as buffers for death tourism. 
Unlike the assisted suicide laws in the Netherlands and in Switzerland 
(detailed below), Oregon and Washington’s assisted suicide laws make 
it extremely difficult for foreign citizens to travel to the United States in 
 
 126. Id. § 127.815(1)(d); see id. § 127.815(1)(b), (e) (remaining requirements of the attending 
physician). 
 127. Id. § 127.815(1)(L). 
 128. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.850 (2003). 
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search of aid in death. In Oregon, it may be possible for a non-resident 
patient to purchase land in the state and file a state tax return.135 
However, the factors are not dispositive in establishing residency for 
purposes of the ODWDA,136 and would nevertheless make death 
tourism an incredibly expensive endeavor. Moreover, even a patient 
who goes through the trouble of establishing a residence in Oregon must 
satisfy additional criteria, such as having a terminal illness and 
demonstrating capability to make the request for assisted suicide.137 The 
statutorily defined terminal illness requirement itself poses significant 
hardship, as a patient who is expected to die within six months would 
likely find it too burdensome to devise a plan to feign residency in the 
state. 
In addition to the residency requirements, the minimum waiting 
periods between the patient’s request and receipt of the prescription 
specified by the ODWDA and WDWDA limit the opportunities for 
death tourism. Under both Acts, at least fifteen days must pass between 
the patient’s initial oral request and the physician’s grant of the 
prescription, and at least forty-eight hours must pass after the patient’s 
written request.138 These waiting periods prevent hasty action, ensuring 
that the patient exercises extreme diligence and care in her decision to 
request and ultimately carry out her own death. Furthermore, both Acts 
stipulate that the attending physician must offer the patient the 
opportunity to rescind her request before providing the prescription, and 
explicitly give the patient the right to rescind her request even when not 
asked by the physician.139 Such strict time requirements prevent patients 
from being able to request assisted suicide in the morning and have that 
request granted by the afternoon. When viewed in conjunction with the 
Acts’ residency requirements, it is no surprise that there have been few, 
if any, reports of patients moving to Oregon or Washington to take 
advantage of their assisted suicide laws.140  
C.  The Netherlands 
In 2001, the Netherlands became the first country to legally 
recognize both PAS and euthanasia with the passage of the Termination 
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of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act (TLRSA).141 Prior to 2001, 
assisted suicide and euthanasia had been “practiced and tolerated” in the 
Netherlands for several decades, despite the country’s ban on both 
practices.142 In the mid-twentieth century, developments in medical 
technology and the maturation of a doctor-patient relationship opened 
the door for discussion regarding end-of-life procedures.143 In 1984, in 
the landmark case of Schoonheim, the Dutch Supreme Court announced 
an exception to the country’s laws prohibiting assisted suicide and 
euthanasia.144 In Schoonheim, a physician administered a lethal injection 
to a ninety-five-year-old woman following repeated requests from her 
that the physician end her life.145 For the first time, the Supreme Court 
held that the physician’s conduct was justified under a theory of 
“necessity” (or overmacht), finding that the physician acted 
appropriately after weighing his conflicting duties to end the patient’s 
suffering on the one hand and to preserve her life on the other.146 
In 1994, the Dutch Supreme Court extended the scope of the 
physician’s “necessity” defense in a case called Chabot.147 There, a 
physician provided lethal medication to a patient who was experiencing 
major depression and intense psychological suffering, but had no 
terminal illness. The Supreme Court held that the “necessity” defense 
applied even where the patient was not terminally ill and was suffering 
from purely psychological symptoms.148 After Chabot, the Dutch 
Parliament made several unsuccessful attempts to legalize PAS and 
euthanasia.149 Finally, in 2001, Parliament passed the TLRSA.150  
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1.  The Netherlands’ Assisted Suicide Law 
Interestingly, the TLRSA, which went into effect in April 2002,151 
did not explicitly legalize PAS and euthanasia; rather, it exempted from 
prosecution physicians who followed a specific due care requirement.152 
The Act amended Articles 293 and 294 of the Dutch Penal Code—
which, respectively, made it a crime to “take another person’s life,”153 
and to “intentionally incite or assist another in committing suicide”154—
by adding a paragraph that immunized physicians who satisfied the due 
care requirements outlined in Article 2 of the Act. These due care 
requirements are met where the physician: 
a. holds the conviction that the request by the patient was voluntary 
and well-considered, 
b. holds the conviction that the patient’s suffering was lasting and 
unbearable, 
c. informed the patient about the situation he was in and about his 
prospects, 
d. and the patient hold the conviction that there was no other 
reasonable solution for the situation he was in, 
e. has consulted at least one other, independent physician who has 
seen the patient and has given his written opinion on the 
requirements of due care, referred to in parts a–d, and 
f. has terminated a life or assisted in a suicide with due care.155 
The Act also provides for PAS and euthanasia for minors as long as the 
minor’s parents are “involved in the decision process” (if the minor is 
between the ages of sixteen and eighteen)156 or explicitly consent (if the 
minor is between the ages of twelve and sixteen).157 
Thus, under the TLRSA, both euthanasia and assisted suicide are 
permissible, as long as the treating physician satisfies the Act’s due care 
requirements. According to the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sport, euthanasia is understood as “the termination of life by a doctor at 
the patient’s request, with the aim of putting an end to unbearable 
suffering with no prospect of improvement.”158 In the Ministry’s view, 
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 152. See id. art. 293, ¶ 2.  
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2011] A Call for International Regulation 307 
this definition includes assisted suicide.159 “Withdrawing or refraining 
from medical treatment at a patient’s request,” however, is not 
considered euthanasia; nor is a physician’s attempt to relieve pain with 
strong medication that incidentally hastens the patient’s death.160 
The TLRSA does not require a patient seeking assistance in death 
to suffer from a terminal illness. Instead, the Act simply mandates that 
the patient’s suffering be “lasting and unbearable.”161 In addition, the 
TLRSA lacks a requirement that the physician assess the patient’s 
competence to request death. While the Act does require physicians to 
ensure that the patient’s request was “voluntary and well-considered,” 
and that the patient has accepted “that there was no other reasonable 
solution,”162 the Act leaves open the possibility that patients with severe 
psychological illnesses, such as major depression or schizophrenia, may 
be granted assistance in death despite a potential lack of competence in 
requesting it. 
2.  The Netherlands as a Potential Death Tourist Destination 
The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport has downplayed the 
idea that the Netherlands can serve as an attractive death tourist 
destination. In response to the question, “Can patients from other 
countries come to the Netherlands for euthanasia?” the Ministry has 
stated: 
No. This cannot happen because a close doctor-patient relationship is 
required. Under the new Act, a patient’s suffering must be 
unbearable, with no prospect of improvement, and his request for 
euthanasia must be voluntary, carefully considered and repeated. To 
assess these criteria, a doctor has to know a patient well. This means 
that the patient needs to have been seeing the doctor for some time 
already.163 
Contrary to the Ministry’s position, it is, in fact, feasible for the 
Netherlands to play a role in the death tourism industry. Although a 
close doctor-patient relationship is endorsed, several of the TLRSA’s 
provisions actually undermine the Ministry’s stance. First, noticeably 
absent from the TLRSA’s criteria is a requirement that the patient be a 
resident of the Netherlands. Second, while the TLRSA requires the 
treating physician to consult an independent physician, who must see 
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the patient and confirm in writing the requirements of due care,164 the 
Act does not dictate a specific amount of time required between the 
patient’s initial request for death, the two physicians’ evaluations, and 
the ultimate life-ending act. Consequently, it is conceivable that a 
foreign citizen could travel to the Netherlands, see a primary and 
consulting physician in a matter of days, and be assisted in death. 
Finally, the TLRSA’s omission of a terminal illness requirement makes 
the Netherlands an attractive option for a wider group of potential death 
tourists, including those suffering from depression, physical disabilities, 
and other non-life-threatening illnesses. 
Despite these factors, death tourism has thus far not proven to be a 
significant concern in the Netherlands. This may be attributed to the 
culture of the Dutch medical community, which favors long-standing 
relationships between physicians and patients,165 making it unlikely that 
a physician would agree to assist a patient in death after having just met 
and evaluated her. Additionally, Dutch physicians enjoy wide discretion 
in deciding whether to grant a patient’s request for PAS or 
euthanasia,166 providing another explanation for the rare incidence of 
death tourism in the country. Still, the language of the TLRSA makes 
the Netherlands a more viable death tourist destination than its leaders 
would care to admit.  
D.  Switzerland 
This Note has thus far considered the laws of three countries:  the 
United Kingdom—where both assisted suicide and euthanasia are 
strictly forbidden, though new guidelines issued by the DPP may relax 
the prosecution of assisted suicide in some cases; the United States—
where only Oregon and Washington have passed laws permitting PAS 
in certain situations, and euthanasia remains unconditionally prohibited; 
and the Netherlands—where assisted suicide and euthanasia are allowed 
as long as the physician satisfies the TLRSA’s requirements of due care. 
At this point, it is important to mention that in addition to the 
Netherlands and the aforementioned states in the United States, there 
are only three other countries that currently allow assisted suicide. 
Those countries are Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland.167 This 
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Note does not address the laws of the former two,168 but will instead 
focus on the latter country in this final part of the analysis. 
1.  The Law in Switzerland 
Switzerland currently boasts the most liberal assisted suicide laws 
of any country in the world.169 It has approved of the practice for over 
sixty years.170 Although it does not permit euthanasia, the Swiss law 
contains several key features that make the country the most popular 
destination for death tourists today.171 
Articles 114 and 115 of the Swiss Penal Code govern end-of-life 
jurisprudence in Switzerland. Article 114 provides, “[a] person who, for 
decent reasons, especially compassion, kills a person on the basis of his 
or her serious and insistent request, will be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment [between three days and three years].”172 In other words, 
active euthanasia is expressly banned. Article 115 provides, “[a] person 
who, for selfish reasons, incites someone to commit suicide or who 
assists that person in doing so will, if the suicide was carried out or 
attempted, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment [. . .] of up to five 
years.”173 The negative implication of this provision is that a person 
who assists another in committing suicide for unselfish reasons will not 
be punished. Such, in fact, is precisely the case:  assisted suicide is 
permissible under Swiss law as long as the assisting party is not 
motivated by selfishness.174  
There are several important aspects of the Swiss law that 
distinguish it from that of other countries. First, and most strikingly, the 
Swiss law does not limit assisted suicide to physicians.175 Thus, whereas 
the Netherlands and the States of Oregon and Washington require a 
physician to oversee the patient’s death, the Swiss law allows any 
individual to assist another in committing suicide. This is especially 
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significant because the lack of legally-mandated physician presence 
enables clinics such as Dignitas to operate using clinical workers and 
volunteers. Second, the Swiss law does not require a second opinion 
from a consulting physician before the patient is granted her request to 
die.176 This omission is in stark contrast to the laws of both the 
Netherlands and the United States, where attending physicians must 
refer the patient to a consulting physician before providing the patient 
with a prescription for lethal medication. In practice, these first two 
features of the Swiss law make it possible to grant a patient assistance in 
suicide relatively quickly after she makes her initial request.177  
A third significant feature of the Swiss law is that it does not 
require that the patient be terminally ill or suffer from a severe physical 
disability.178 This aspect of the law has generated perhaps the most 
criticism from the international community.179 Dignitas founder Ludwig 
Minelli has openly advocated helping healthy individuals commit 
suicide, and has admitted that the Dignitas clinic helps kill non-
terminally ill patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.180 
Although the Dutch law also lacks a terminal illness requirement, the 
TLRSA nevertheless requires the patient’s suffering to be “lasting and 
unbearable,” and the physician must be certain that the patient’s request 
was voluntary and well-considered.181 Under the Swiss law, however, 
the combination of assistance to the non-terminally ill and failure to 
ensure the patient’s competence and voluntariness results in the realistic 
possibility of patients being killed even if they are suffering from 
mental disorders that adversely affect their decision-making abilities.  
In addition to these features, the Swiss law’s final defining 
characteristic, the absence of a residency requirement, makes 
Switzerland the most popular destination for death tourists. Indeed, as 
one commentator has stated, “[p]erhaps the status of the Netherlands 
and Belgium (and eventually Luxembourg) as death-tourism 
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destinations remains untested because Switzerland offers an 
unambiguous opportunity for assisted suicide abroad.”182  
Thousands of individuals have been assisted in obtaining death in 
one of Switzerland’s several assisted suicide clinics. The largest of these 
clinics, EXIT, has been operating since 1982 and currently has over 
fifty thousand members.183 EXIT sets itself apart from Dignitas in a 
number of ways. Although Swiss law does not require it, EXIT only 
accepts terminally ill or severely suffering patients.184 EXIT also 
ensures that patients have proper capacity to request assisted suicide and 
will not grant such a request if the patient is suffering from 
depression.185 Finally, EXIT only accommodates Swiss citizens or 
foreign citizens who permanently reside in Switzerland.186 In light of 
these practices, it appears that EXIT is not a significant player in the 
death tourism industry. 
Dignitas is reportedly the only clinic that accepts non-resident 
patients. It is thus the driving force behind the death tourism 
phenomenon. Dignitas has helped hundreds of foreign citizens commit 
suicide, more than one hundred of whom have come from the United 
Kingdom.187 It also currently possesses over eight hundred British 
members,188 and more than half of its non-resident patients have come 
from the United Kingdom and Germany.189 Minelli has stated that he 
believes the right to die is the very last human right, and there can be no 
discrimination in the granting of this right simply based on an 
individual’s residence.190 Therefore, he sees no reason to restrict 
Dignitas’s services solely to citizens or residents of Switzerland.  
According to Minelli, media reports that patients can arrive at the 
clinic and commit suicide that same day are sensationalized.191 He 
claims that there is a more formal process in place:  first, the patient has 
to become a member of Dignitas, which includes paying a registration 
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fee and annual membership; then, the patient must send a letter of 
request and her medical file.192 Once a patient takes these steps, 
Dignitas arranges an appointment for the patient with a physician (recall 
that the Swiss law does not require a physician to participate in the 
assisted suicide), who will meet with the patient and ultimately 
determine whether he will write a prescription for lethal medication.193 
Minelli emphasizes that, in accordance with the Swiss prohibition on 
euthanasia, the patient must be able to take the ultimate life-ending act 
herself.194 
Despite Minelli’s assurances that Dignitas takes procedural 
precautions against death tourists, the clinic remains the most viable 
option for patients seeking a “quick death.” The Swiss assisted suicide 
law has no residency or terminal illness requirement and does not 
mandate that the assisting party be a physician; the law only prohibits 
assisted suicide for selfish reasons.195 While EXIT nevertheless accepts 
primarily Swiss patients who are terminally ill or severely suffering, 
Dignitas accommodates a much wider range of patients seeking death. 
As a result of Switzerland’s permissive assisted suicide law, Dignitas 
has established the country as the death tourist capital of the world. 
2.  The Future of Dignitas 
For all of the criticism it has endured, Dignitas remains committed 
to its goals and methods. However, in the wake of the Downes’ story 
and increasingly intense debate about the clinic’s practices, the Swiss 
government has threatened tighter regulations of assisted suicide 
organizations and possible closure of the Dignitas clinic. In October 
2009, the government proposed two bills for public debate:196  the first 
of these bills proposed stricter duties of care for employees of assisted 
suicide organizations, while the second bill proposed a complete ban on 
organized assisted suicide.197 Groups of cantons, political parties, and 
other organizations deliberated on the bills, and while a majority 
ultimately rejected both, they agreed that some type of federal-level 
action was necessary.198 The first bill, which would have required 
assisted suicide patients to be terminally ill and three physicians to 
confirm a patient’s legal capacity to make the decision and verify the 
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presence of a terminal illness, was criticized as too complex, opaque, 
and discriminatory.199 The second bill, which would have completely 
banned the practices of assisted suicide clinics, was rejected as an 
unlawful restriction on the patient’s right of self-determination.200  
Recognizing the desire of the public for some type of regulation of 
assisted suicide organizations, in September 2010, the Swiss Federal 
Council announced that it would instruct the Federal Department of 
Justice and Police to revise the first bill and the Federal Department of 
Home Affairs to make recommendations to improve suicide prevention 
and palliative care.201 Both bodies were expected to submit their 
proposals to the Swiss parliament by the end of 2010,202 at which point 
parliament would engage in a debate over a future course of action. 
According to Justice Minister Markus Notter, any new legislation would 
not ban suicide trips to Switzerland, but would effectively end “quick 
suicides” for foreign citizens.203 Although it is possible that new 
legislation may force Dignitas to significantly change its practices, the 
opportunities created by Switzerland’s assisted suicide law could lead to 
the establishment of more clinics like Dignitas that accommodate death 
tourists.  
IV.   SOFT LAW REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL DEATH TOURISM 
Death tourism is a divisive issue that engenders public and 
political debate about a largely private and non-political topic. It 
produces a wide array of opinions, based on varying ideological beliefs 
and political views. Some may consider death tourism a wonderful 
possibility, one that recognizes the fundamental right to “die with 
dignity” and grants patients an opportunity to achieve that which their 
own country denies them.204 Others, however, may perceive death 
tourism as an exploitative venture, one that disregards legal principles 
of comity and sovereignty.  
Those who fall into the first category might wonder:  Why do 
anything about death tourism at all? How is death tourism any different 
from individuals traveling to foreign countries and engaging in activities 
that are unavailable or forbidden in their own countries? After all, 
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assisted suicide is legal in Switzerland. What obligation does 
Switzerland have to actively deny British citizens the same right it 
extends to its own citizens? These questions are legitimate and well-
founded. As mentioned earlier, this Note’s purpose is not to advocate or 
object to assisted suicide. Rather, this Note argues that assisted suicide 
is inherently different from any other activity in which citizens engage 
while abroad. The moral implications of assisted suicide and its 
unalterable finality distinguish it from such activities as experimenting 
with illicit drugs or engaging in benign mischief. It is a practice to 
which nations have been afforded a margin of appreciation in regulation 
and enforcement.205 Because of its unique and absolute consequences, 
assisted suicide transcends domestic restrictions and implicates core 
principles of sovereignty and international comity. The current system, 
which encourages individuals to shop for clinics that abide by the least 
restrictive assisted suicide laws, offends these core principles and 
should be regulated. 
At first glance, it appears that death tourism is largely an internal 
phenomenon, operating solely in Switzerland, and even more 
exclusively, only in the Dignitas clinic. However, as mentioned above, 
Switzerland’s position as the unequivocal leader of the death tourism 
industry may explain why countries such as the Netherlands and 
Belgium have not drawn similar appeal.206 Even the prospective 
domestic regulation of clinics such as Dignitas may not fully inhibit the 
trend, as current laws leave open the possibility that other clinics in 
Switzerland or elsewhere may emerge. Therefore, international 
regulation of death tourism is essential in curtailing the practice.  
The most effective tool for curtailing death tourism is an 
instrument of soft law. As explained below, the informality and 
flexibility of soft law, as well as its persuasive mechanisms, make it 
uniquely suited for regulating morally and ethically charged issues such 
as assisted suicide. Part A defines soft law and distinguishes it from the 
traditional concept of hard law. Part B then explains why soft law 
provides a more favorable means of regulating death tourism than a 
hard law alternative.  
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A.  Soft Law as a Less Formal and More Conciliatory Framework Than 
Hard Law 
There are several approaches to defining soft law. As Professor 
Andrew T. Guzman explains, one approach is to identify what soft law 
is not.207 It is not hard law, “meaning [it is not] treaties or custom, nor is 
it a purely political understanding without a legal component.”208 
Instead, it is “what lies between these two alternatives.”209 Another 
approach is to define soft law as a system of norms or principles that 
guide states’ actions, rather than a framework of formal rules.210 In its 
clearest sense, soft law is a non-binding, informal instrument of 
international law that imposes moral or political commitments on 
nations, rather than legal obligations. It includes instruments such as 
declarations, recommendations, charters, and resolutions.211 
Soft law differs in several important respects from hard law, the 
“classic” concept of international law. The most basic difference is that 
soft law is non-binding. Thus, whereas hard law has actual binding 
effect (such as a treaty upon ratification, or a custom that has 
“hardened” into actual law), soft law is only “potentially binding.”212 In 
other words, soft law can be conceived as a proposal that will gradually 
evolve into hard law. A clear example of this is the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which has, since its creation in 1948, 
gained acceptance as customary international law.213 A second 
difference between soft and hard law is that soft law is less formal, and 
thus involves fewer procedural costs and enables quicker 
implementation than a treaty, which requires formal ratification.214 A 
third difference is in the enforcement of soft and hard law. Unlike hard 
law, which is more readily enforceable through judicial intervention, 
dispute resolution, or sanctions, soft law depends almost entirely on the 
willingness of states to regulate their own actions and fulfill their own 
commitments. These differences lead many to dismiss soft law as a 
weaker form of an already practically unenforceable international legal 
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system.215 In contrast to this view, however, there are advantages to 
adopting a soft law instrument instead of a hard law instrument. 
The fact that soft law is non-binding encourages states to agree to 
its terms. Soft law’s non-binding effect assures states that they will not 
be sanctioned for violating an agreement, and gives states flexibility in 
determining the extent of their obligations. One may wonder:  If the 
agreement is non-binding, then what is the point of implementing it at 
all? The answer is that more states are likely to acquiesce to the 
agreement, which can lead to international compromise and mutually 
beneficial cooperation.216 Furthermore, in the absence of direct 
sanctions, non-binding agreements can still impose “reputational” 
sanctions, which can be just as costly for states in the international 
arena. For example, states that violate international commitments signal 
to other states that they do not take such commitments seriously. Thus, 
when these states seek to enter into more formal agreements in the 
future, other states will take into account their previous actions and may 
be less willing to make concessions or compromises to accommodate 
the offending states.217  
In addition, the informality of soft law instruments makes the 
process of agreeing to them much simpler than that for hard law 
instruments. The lack of a requirement of ratification allows states to 
reduce their “contracting costs,” such as the costs of negotiating and 
consulting with legal specialists, as well as their “sovereignty costs,” 
such as the potential for inferior outcomes, loss of authority and control, 
and the diminution of sovereignty.218 Without these costs, states are 
much more willing to acquiesce to certain commitments and to 
recognize their obligations under those commitments. The less formal 
framework of soft law also provides for quicker implementation and a 
more direct influence on states’ behavior219 than would a long and 
drawn out treaty-making process.  
Finally, the soft enforcement, or “dispute avoidance,”220 of soft law 
can lead to more cooperative and conciliatory resolution of disputes. 
Rather than being adjudicated in an international court or subjected to 
compulsory settlement procedures, soft enforcement can take the form 
of negotiated inducements through a neutral third party or independent 
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problem solving. Professor Alan E. Boyle cites the non-compliance 
procedure adopted by the parties to the 1987 Montreal Protocol to the 
Ozone Convention as an example.221 Any party to the protocol can 
invoke the procedure, at which point the matter is referred to an 
Implementation Committee for investigation. The committee considers 
the information at hand and produces a report that calls for an amicable 
solution.222 This solution can include the provision of financial, 
technical, or training assistance to the non-complying party. If this is 
insufficient, the committee can issue a caution against the party, or even 
suspend its rights if necessary.223 Whatever the ultimate solution, its 
significance is that soft law enforcement avoids obligatory and 
adversarial dispute resolution, and thus protects the legal interests of the 
parties involved.  
B.  A Soft Law Instrument is Favorable in Dealing with Death Tourism 
With this backdrop of hard versus soft law in mind, it is evident 
that an instrument of soft law would most effectively curtail death 
tourism. A multilateral treaty is neither prudent nor feasible in this 
context. Indeed, Switzerland has no incentive in ratifying a treaty that 
prohibits it from extending its own assisted suicide guarantees simply 
on the basis of residency. Although its assisted suicide clinics are non-
profit,224 Switzerland’s economy undoubtedly benefits from being the 
sole destination for many prospective PAS patients and their families. It 
would be an egregious affront to the country’s sovereignty if it were 
forced to deny a valid and legal protection of its laws to non-residents. 
Switzerland would suffer extremely high “sovereignty costs” in such an 
arrangement, and would face the threat of monetary sanctions for 
essentially abiding by its own laws within its jurisdiction. 
Instead of a treaty, the United Nations General Assembly should 
propose a recommendation to decrease the incidence of death tourism. 
This recommendation should call for international comity through the 
recognition of, and respect for, other nations’ assisted suicide laws. 
Thus, a non-terminally ill British citizen, who faces a ban against 
assisted suicide in her own country, would not be able to travel to 
Switzerland to be assisted in death in disregard of the U.K.’s assisted 
suicide protocol. Similarly, a United States citizen residing in 
 
 221. Id. at 910. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See Amelia Gentleman, Inside the Dignitas House, GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2009), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/nov/18/assisted-suicide-dignitas-house. 
  
318 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 33:287 
California, who suffers from lasting and unbearable pain as a result of a 
physical injury, would not be able to travel to the Netherlands and be 
euthanized after meeting with an attending and consulting physician. 
The recommendation would not ban assisted suicide or attempt to 
influence states’ legislation on the subject within their own territory. 
Rather, it would simply call on states to abide by their neighbors’ laws 
in the context of assisted suicide and prevent the spread of death 
tourism.  
A recommendation from the General Assembly would necessarily 
be non-binding on the states that adopt it. Notwithstanding this aspect of 
the proposal, it is likely that a large number of states would agree to its 
terms. Only three states in the United States and four other countries in 
the world legally recognize some form of assisted suicide.225 In one way 
or another, nearly all of these countries have dismissed or expressed 
concern over its potential as a death tourist destination.226 Therefore, it 
is not overly ambitious to predict that nearly every state that is asked to 
adopt the recommendation would do so. Those states that refuse to, 
while not in violation of any legal obligation, could face international 
pressure from states that either prohibit or heavily regulate assisted 
suicide.  
Additionally, the recommendation’s informal nature would lead to 
quick implementation and an almost immediate impact on states’ 
behavior. States would face little to no contracting costs in adopting the 
recommendation and would retain substantial flexibility in framing their 
own assisted suicide laws.  
Finally, the soft enforcement mechanism afforded by the 
recommendation would grant states relative freedom in settling disputes 
if a party violates its commitment. States may choose to form an 
independent committee to oversee the regulation of the recommendation 
or they may choose to separately engage in cooperative dispute 
resolution. The recommendation would effectively serve to inform 
states of their mutual commitments, while simultaneously preserving 
their rights as sovereign nations to pass their own laws and govern 
behavior within their own borders. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Death tourism is a phenomenon that has produced both wide-
ranging debate about the legitimacy of end-of-life practices and 
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declarations by international leaders that their countries will not become 
breeding grounds for death tourists. It has prompted individuals to 
appeal to their countries’ lawmakers to legalize assisted suicide so that 
terminally ill patients would not have to travel abroad to end their 
suffering. Regardless of one’s views about the legality or morality of 
assisted suicide, most would agree that a one-way ticket for a “quick 
death” is hardly equivalent to a vacation that involves some 
irresponsible recreational activities. Still, proponents of assisted suicide 
may maintain that death tourists are simply taking advantage of duly 
enacted laws that govern the countries to which they travel.  
There are currently only a handful of nations that allow assisted 
suicide.227 Of these nations, only Switzerland has thus far played a 
significant role in the death tourism industry.228 A change in Swiss law, 
however, is not necessary to deal with death tourism. As a sovereign 
nation, Switzerland has every right to pass laws legalizing assisted 
suicide. Rather, this is an issue that demands international regulation. 
An instrument of soft law, in the form of a recommendation from 
the United Nations General Assembly, would be the most effective tool 
for reducing death tourism. The recommendation would be non-binding, 
yet it would attract the vast majority of countries that are asked to adopt 
it. It would grant states flexibility in determining their own obligations, 
while placing pressure on those states that are reluctant to fulfill their 
commitments. The recommendation’s informal nature would allow it to 
go into effect almost immediately, which would result in a direct and 
rapid influence on states’ actions. Finally, it would encourage 
cooperative dispute resolution and help states avoid the high costs of 
formal adoption, implementation, and enforcement.  
Sir Edward and Lady Joan were neither the first nor likely the last 
couple to achieve their wish of dying together. Without proper 
international regulation of death tourism in place, it will not be long 
before a severely depressed, yet physically healthy teenager is able to 
purchase a train ticket to a neighboring country and convince a 
volunteer clinical worker that she would like to end her life. 
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